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In recent years, the most pressing debates among historians of the African American 
Freedom Struggle have revolved around the concept of a long Civil Rights Movements. The 
details of those historiographical arguments may be new, but they reflect a well-established 
pattern, for they concentrate on one side of what was a two-sided struggle: as the activities of 
civil rights’ proponents become ever more contextualised, white opposition to African 
American advancement has remained relatively overlooked.
2
 The main debates have left 
Massive Resistance narrowly defined as a decade-long political backlash triggered by the 
Supreme Court’s Brown ruling and ending with the passage of Civil Rights legislation in the 
mid-1960s, despite some historians’ exploration of the depth and complexity of a 
segregationist movement that was too diverse and multifaceted simply to be initiated by the 
Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling or halted by the Civil and Voting Rights Acts.3 Studies of pre-
Brown and post-1964 expressions of white opposition have expanded our understanding of 
Massive Resistance to an evolving expression and often violent implementation of white 
supremacy encompassing political, social and economic facets. This understanding 
incorporates white southern opposition to the New Deal, the Southern Manifesto and 
interposition, White Citizens Councils, State Sovereignty Commissions and the Coordinating 
Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms to anti-busing campaigns, finding national 
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political expression through the Dixiecrat Revolt, Goldwater, Wallace, Reagan and (to a 
certain extent) Nixon.
4
 One of the most significant aspects of post-1964 Massive Resistance 
is its links to emerging national conservatism. Focusing on a single southern state, historian 
Joseph Crespino has shown how outright opposition gave way to ‘strategic accommodations’ 
and the segregationist rhetoric of Mississippi Governors such as Theodore Bilbo and Ross 
Barnett softened into ostensibly race neutral language which entrenched white supremacy 
without the vitriolic racism and violence of ‘short’ Massive Resistance.5 While post-1964 
Massive Resistance saw a marked change in the extent of accommodation, white opponents 
of African American advancement drew on the mechanisms and methods of Massive 
Resistance dating back to the 1930s.
6
  
The available historical evidence points unequivocally to the need to contextualise 
white opposition to civil rights activists as richly as their opponents, for there are clear 
connections between these distinct manifestations of Massive Resistance, through 
expressions of social, political and economic conservatism and continuities in the rhetoric 
and mechanisms of opposition. A focus on segregationist opposition to federal social welfare 
programs, for example, illuminates clear connections from white southern opposition to the 
New Deal to opponents of Johnson’s Great Society and white southern support for Reagan in 
his attacks on welfare queens and war on welfare. White opposition to the War on Poverty 
provides an insight into this link at a significant moment as whites who struggled to find a 
coherent response to Civil Rights legislation, the changing nature of the Southern Democratic 
                                                     
4
 Glenn Feldman, (ed.) Before Brown: Civil Rights and White Backlash in the Modern South, (Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 2004) 
5
 Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution, 
(Woodstock: 2007). Language which was inherited from the rhetoric of earlier Mississippi politicians rather 
than an invention of the suburban Sunbelt, although the importance of this language to the conservatism of the 
Sunbelt Suburbs is clearly illustrated by Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the making of modern 
conservatism, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005) and Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: 
Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
6
 At least 1930; Crespino notes that conservative colour blindness and racial code words were being used by 
Mississippi segregationists as far back as 1890. Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 8-9 
Party and the growing conservatism of the national Republican Party, found controversial 
antipoverty programs a useful target for uniting opposition. Drawing on some of the methods 
and mechanisms of the earlier expressions of Massive Resistance, white opponents of the 
War on Poverty began the evolution of an ostensibly colour blind language of opposition to 
social welfare that would become a central tenet of national conservative opposition to 
welfare.
7
  
Sociologists and historians have begun to explore the often controversial connections 
between Civil Rights activists and War on Poverty programs in the South. Studies by 
Kenneth T. Andrews, Susan Youngblood Ashmore, Kent Germany and Amy Jordan have 
deepened our understanding of the era traditionally seen as the demise of the Civil Rights 
Movement through their examinations of the connections and conflicts between antipoverty 
programs and Civil Rights activists.
8
 However, white opposition to antipoverty programs, 
though widely publicised at the time, especially in Mississippi, has received little scholarly 
attention.
9
 Head Start in Mississippi, at first in the form of the highly controversial Child 
Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), gave meaning to newly-won political rights of 
African Americans. Developing from Freedom Summer’s Freedom Schools, CDGM was 
established by the outsiders so reviled by Mississippi’s white establishment. However, at the 
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local level Head Start centres were staff by local poor African Americans and it was here at 
the grassroots that the program had its most significant impact. Employment in Head Start 
programs meant poor African Americans could register to vote without losing their jobs. 
More than this it provided African Americans, for the first time with a meaningful measure of 
power and control over their lives, providing an opportunity to exercise the right and 
responsibility to think, act and choose for themselves and their children.
10
 Historians of the 
Civil Rights Movement have focused too much on the impact of outsiders to the exclusion of 
the equally important African American activists left behind in their wake. CDGM, 
established and operated at the state level by white northern liberals and CDGM-remnants, 
the grass roots African American Head Start centres left without funding after the white 
campaign against CDGM, thus provide an example of what was left after the outsiders (and 
the national attention they brought with them) departed.
11
 These CDGM-remnants, like Civil 
Rights activists after Freedom Summer, were left to face white Mississippi’s backlash. In the 
white establishment’s attempts to seize control of federal funds coupled with their reluctant 
acceptance of a limited amount of African American involvement the evolution of Massive 
Resistance becomes apparent.  
Mississippi serves as an ideal location for such a case study. Not only was the state at 
the heart of the majority of the manifestations of Massive Resistance, Mississippi was central 
to the emerging national conservatism and home to one of the earliest and most controversial 
Head Start programs in the county, a program whose turbulent history and legacy showcases 
the effects of the presence and departure of outsiders. Mississippi’s Massive Resistance, like 
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its contribution to emerging national conservatism was unique and important but not 
exceptional. Indeed, the growth of the modern Republican Party in a state lacking the Sunbelt 
Suburbs that scholars have shown to be the natural breeding ground of Republicanism makes 
Mississippi not exceptional but central. Republicanism here drew on less on a shared 
environment than on a basic conservative cultural, racial and religious foundation.
12
 
Mississippi, as the poorest state also provides a unique vantage point on the War on Poverty. 
Its antipoverty programs were diverse and controversial though markedly different from the 
large, urban and intensely politicised Community Action Programs (CAPs) that are the usual 
focus of scholarly attention. Opposition to Mississippi’s War on Poverty programs thus 
illustrates the development of the race neutral language that would become central to 
emerging national conservatism, while drawing on the mechanisms of post-Brown Massive 
Resistance, the political discontent of the Dixiecrat Revolt and white Southern conservative 
opposition to the New Deal.  
In opposing CDGM, white Mississippi – from the political elite to the grassroots – 
utilised the methods, mechanisms and rhetoric of earlier phases of Massive Resistance. 
Mississippi’s politicians drew on the anti-communism of the post-Brown Massive Resistance 
as well as more successfully utilising the State Sovereignty Commission to infiltrate, 
undermine and report on the CDGM. Local reporters played on the white community’s fears 
of anticommunism and the new threat of Black Power, combining them with New Deal era 
and Dixiecrat rhetoric opposing social welfare programs and federal intervention. Senator 
Stennis, responding to the demands of his constituents wielded his influence to bring pressure 
on the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the White House to defund CDGM.
13
 
                                                     
12
 Crespino, In Search of Another County, 5. Chris Danielson, After Freedom Summer: How Race Realigned 
Mississippi Politics, 1965-1986 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011) 5 
13
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the State Sovereignty Commission expanded its spy network to infiltrate the Groups’ Head 
Start centres. Used by Senator Stennis in his press briefings and Senate statements, the 
Sovereignty Commission reports provided a wealth of material for the local media to 
construct an image of Head Start as corrupt, a waste of tax dollars and as a source of funding 
of Civil Rights activism. Local reporters called for responsible Mississippians to run local 
programs, frequently referring to the lack of judgment of administration bureaucrats and of 
the generous distribution of tax money, carefully constructed language which not only avoids 
overt references to race, but which draws on powerful Southern tenets opposing federal 
interference and concerns over the redistribution of wealth.
14
 The mechanisms of earlier 
Massive Resistance were successfully combined with a new language which echoed the 
conservative rhetoric of Senator Barry Goldwater, drawing on his extensive base of support 
in the state.
15
 The Sovereignty Commission and local press employed the Massive Resistance 
rhetoric of “outside agitators” and charges of communism, linking their opposition to CDGM 
to wider national concerns. Charges of communistic activity failed to have any weight with 
OEO, as accusations were even more unlikely than earlier charges of communism against 
Civil Rights activists.
16 
With HUAC in terminal decline and the Vietnam War becoming 
increasingly unpopular, appealing to anticommunism was less successful. However, such 
accusations found favour with the local press, who reported frequently on the red influence 
on OEO programs. In the wake of the Watts riot local reporters utilised the new national fears 
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of Black Power, depicting CDGM as ‘an instrument of the black separatist movement’.17 One 
of the most potent aspects of all phases of Massive Resistance had been politicians’ and 
reporters success in linking the overt racism of the Deep South with wider concerns. Both the 
Dixiecrat revolt and opponents of school integration drew on national concerns of the 
expanding power of the federal government; anti-Communism provided a rich vein of 
hysteria to exploit. Now the menace of Black Power replaced the threat of Communism as 
local whites seized on fears of Black Nationalism to articulate grassroots white fears about an 
outside alien force in a way that had national resonance.  
The evolution of the language of Massive Resistance was one of the most significant 
and potent legacies of white opposition to CDGM. However, not all of the elements of 
Massive Resistance proved as successful; ultimately Stennis’ campaign failed to rid 
Mississippi of Head Start or the Child Development Group. While the White House was 
susceptible to pressure from Senator Stennis, OEO Director Sargent Shriver’s commitment to 
support grassroots organisations, though weak, was bolstered by his desire to avoid further 
adverse publicity.
18
 Though irreversibly damaged and robbed of its ability to be an instrument 
for social change the strength, perseverance and dedication of CDGM staff ensured the 
Group’s survival albeit with significantly reduced funding.19 Across the state, CDGM had 
engaged poor African American communities in Head Start and those communities were now 
left without funding and facing the wrath of local whites newly awakened to the potential 
threat of the War on Poverty. Senators John C. Stennis and James O. Eastland presented a 
united public front of opposition to the Great Society but having discredited CDGM, they 
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used their influence in Washington to increase Mississippi’s share of antipoverty funds. In 
Mississippi, they mobilised networks of power and influence to wrest control of this money 
from grassroots African American programs. Eastland drew on his long history of subverting 
federal funds intended to aid the poor into his own, and other rich planters’ coffers, while 
Stennis responded to white constituents concerns by encouraging local responsible people to 
take control of federal funds in their communities.
20
 State Sovereignty Commission 
investigators, unable to secure any further sanctions against the group turned their vicious 
attention to any Head Start program linked to CDGM, however tenuous the connection. Over 
the next several years, Commission Investigators wrote hundreds of reports on these alleged 
CDGM-influenced programs, undermining CDGM offshoot Friends of the Children of 
Mississippi and CDGM’s state-wide biracial, establishment-approved replacement 
Mississippi Action for Progress. The Commission provided evidence to successive governors 
on alleged malfeasance in various African American, former CDGM programs. As white 
politicians, local officials and businessmen across the state created their own Community 
Action Agencies, they clashed with these CDGM-remnants for control of federal funds. 
While these battles played out differently in communities across the state, poor African 
Americans tenaciously clung onto their programs, sometimes successfully but more often not. 
Despite the eventual and perhaps inevitable near universal loss of control of their programs 
by poor blacks, battles with the local white establishment had a profound effect on the future 
of Head Start in the state. 
The rural, Delta Bolivar and Sunflower Counties offer the opportunity to explore 
often overlooked rural Community Action Programs and to examine the complexity and 
diversity of the white response to Head Start despite the similar political, economic, 
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geographic and racial characteristics of the two counties. Extremist white segregationists 
dominated every aspect of social, economic and political life, violently enforcing segregation 
in the small isolated communities of Bolivar and Sunflower Counties. Historians of the Klan 
have pointed to a diminishing impact of violent extremism in the late-1960s. Drabble 
suggests that the FBI’s Counterintelligence White Hate Program had successfully infiltrated 
the organisation and despite their lack of success in securing prosecutions the HUAC’s Klan 
investigations did have some effect in diminishing Klan activity.
21
 However, as Newton has 
noted Southwest Mississippi became a hotbed of extremist violence from 1964, violence 
which persisted throughout the remainder of the decade spreading into the Delta and much of 
the rest of the state. Delta counties had been dominated by White Citizens Councils in the 
decade following Brown; unlike the hill counties of Southwest Mississippi, the repressive 
racial structure of the plantation economy rendered the Klan’s violent enforcement 
unnecessary.
22
 However, with the decline of Citizens Council influence and the increasing 
activism of African Americans in the Delta, violent white supremacist organisations began to 
make headway in these counties. By 1966, FBI reports on Klan activity indicate the presence 
of the Klan in Bolivar, Coahoma, Leflore, Washington and Yazoo Counties.
23
 Internal 
conflicts and inter-Klan rivalries created a volatile situation. Between the Mississippi White 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the Alabama-based United Klans of America (who had made 
Adams County a base from which to invade Mississippi) and the Americans for the 
Preservation of the White Race, white extremists’ influence remained widespread and 
entrenched amongst local officials, businessmen and even churches in many areas of 
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Mississippi in the late 1960s.
24
 Individual acts of terror against Civil Rights Activists, such as 
the bombing of the car of local NAACP leader George Metcalfe in 1965 and a second attempt 
on his life the following year, expanded to include violent attacks on Head Start staff and 
centres across the state. Beginning in 1965 with shootings and arson attacks against CDGM 
centres, violent opposition to Head Start expanded to include the harassment, intimidation 
and economic oppression of Head Start personnel both black and white, CDGM and non-
CDGM affiliated. CDGM’s state-wide biracial successor Mississippi Action for Progress 
faced a wave of violence against its white employees in 1967.
25
 Although attacks waned by 
the end of the decade, Head Start centres remained targets of violent white opposition; in 
1970 a County Attorney in Liberty threw a brick through the window of Amite County’s 
Head Start office.
26
 
 
Bolivar County 
Bolivar County’s poor white community remained committed to segregation and 
largely unaffected by the passage of the Civil Rights legislation by 1965. Despite the extent 
and depth of poverty in the county poor whites uniformly refused to send their children to 
CDGM’s Head Start centres. High unemployment due to agricultural mechanisation and lack 
of industry and poor housing, health and sanitation resulting from widespread tenant farming 
and sharecropping meant 43.1 percent of the county’s population lived in poverty. There 
were numerically far more poor African Americans in the county; around 10 percent of the 
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white population lived in poverty while over 90 percent of the African American population 
of the county were poor.
27
 The poor African American community, numerically larger than 
the poor white community and more accustomed to community activism through Civil Rights 
and church activities, saw more quickly than poor whites the potential of Head Start to help 
the entire poor community and not just children.
28
 However, the middle class whites involved 
in creating Bolivar County Community Action Program (BCCAP) were both more pragmatic 
about the unavoidability of the Civil Rights legislation and the need for federal funds and 
perhaps most importantly, would be less immediately affected by the required integration. 
White Board members included businessmen, local officials and civic leaders whose children 
would not have to attend the potentially integrated Head Start classes. Recognising that 
access to and thus control over federal funds would necessitate accepting certain 
compromises, Bolivar County’s political leadership appointed six white and six African 
American men to serve on the Board of Directors. As acquiescence to OEO’s requirement 
that the Board reflect the racial composition of the community was the only way to secure 
funding – and thus begin to erode support and funding for CDGM in Bolivar County – the 
County’s Community Action Committee voluntarily accepted an integrated Board. As one of 
the first integrated CAP Boards in the South created by the local political leadership, BCCAP 
was lauded in the local (liberal) press.
29
 However this veneer of interracial cooperation 
masked an implacable resistance to ceding control to or even sharing power with African 
Americans. Bolivar County’s white political leadership selected six middle class, 
conservative African Americans as Board members, men with economic ties to the white 
community, a vested interesting in yielding to the demands of the white Board members and 
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very little knowledge of or interest in the needs of poor blacks. Acquiescing to this limited 
and controllable integration, white men like Board Chairman Sam Long and Program 
Director Earl Davis ensured their control of the BCCAP would go unchallenged. BCCAP was 
by no means alone in excluding poor participation. OEO Region III, including Deep South 
states committed to preserving white control, had the lowest percentage of poor 
representation on CAP Boards in the country, Mississippi, the lowest in the region.
30
 
However, Bolivar County’s political establishment was more successful than most. They 
manufactured a program that destroyed the opportunity for genuine poor community 
participation which was lauded for its progressive, interracial success at the state and national 
level.
31
 
Denied the chance for a voice within the establishment program, the county’s former 
CDGM workers continued to operate their Head Start centres voluntarily hoping that 
CDGM’s grant would be renewed. However, in January 1966 it became clear the former 
CDGM centres in the county would not be refunded. CDGM’s $5.3 million grant did not 
include Bolivar County. OEO instead supported the creation of a county-wide Head Start 
program operated under BCCAP, which rejected CDGM’s application to operate as its 
delegate agency in the county.
32
 Bolivar County did not have a diverse or particularly strong 
network of Civil Rights activists. Pockets of activism were isolated and restricted to areas 
with extremely high African American populations such as Shaw and the all-black Mound 
Bayou. However, the proposed operation of Head Start by BCCAP crystallised the 
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mobilisation of the African American community.
33
 Led by local NAACP leader Amzie 
Moore, former CDGM staff, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) and the 
Delta Ministry worked together to build and support the Head Start program voluntarily 
while lobbying OEO for funding. Despite the persistence of white claims that CDGM was the 
lynchpin in a Black Nationalist conspiracy and a front for the MFDP, the Group (and Head 
Start more generally) had been more a source of division than unity for local activists. While 
MFDP was affiliated with state CDGM leadership, at the local level the relationship between 
the two groups could be strained. Many SNCC activists opposed involvement with Head 
Start, fearing the conditions which would be attached to federal funding. The NAACP had a 
particularly stormy relationship with CDGM. State NAACP leaders resented NAACP staff’s 
exclusion from the program; in over eighty centres across the state only one NAACP staff 
member was employed by CDGM. When the NAACP state President Aaron Henry and Field 
Representative Charles Evers gave their support to CDGM’s state-wide replacement 
Mississippi Action for Progress, their relationship deteriorated even further.
34
 Though the 
State Conference voted to support CDGM’s application to OEO for further funding in the 
midst of the controversy, Henry’s acceptance of a position on MAP’s Board infuriated 
CDGM Director John Mudd. Mudd evoked the language of betrayal, drawing comparisons 
with post-Reconstruction era plantations, complete with a white leader and “head nigger”, 
anger echoed in local fliers which called on African American to demonstrate in opposition to 
the ‘third era of slavery’.35 
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Mississippi’s white leaders, uninterested or unaware of the divisions Head Start had 
created amongst activists found the notion of alleging communist inspired Delta Ministry-
CDGM-MFDP coalition appealing. Drawing on the language of earlier Massive Resisters, 
influential Mississippi Democrat lawyer and friend of the President, Douglas Wynn 
attempted to circumvent OEO by appealing directly to the President’s Special Counsel Harry 
McPherson. Combining the threat of Black Power with thinly veiled warnings about the 
potential political consequences of a failure to support BCCAP, Wynn claimed the ‘DM-
CDGM-MFDP coalition’ had been trying in every possible way to defeat the attempts of the 
moderate right thinking people in Mississippi.
36
 McPherson had relied on Wynn’s knowledge 
of Mississippi politics to shape a state-wide replacement for CDGM that was acceptable to 
the white establishment, now Wynn urged him to intervene with OEO in favour of BCCAP. 
OEO, caught been political pressure and their belief that the survival of the former CDGM 
group in Bolivar County was of paramount importance, made the unusual decision to fund 
two parallel Head Start Programs. BCCAP was authorized to create a Head Start program for 
1500 children, while the former CDGM group became Associated Communities of Bolivar 
County (ACBC), serving 1300 children as a delegate agency of BCCAP. Together these two 
Head Start programs employed over 700 people and received $1.75 million federal funds 
annually.
37
 
Despite having secured funding for their own Head Start program, BCCAP’s Board 
and Executive Director Earl Davis remained concerned that ACBC would fuel Civil Rights 
activities and teach children Black Power. ACBC neither funded Civil Rights activities nor 
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taught Black Power, but it did have a profound impact on the entire African American 
community. The white threat to Head Start united the limited and isolated activists operating 
in the county in defence of the program.
38
 ACBC gave poor blacks independence from 
oppression and deprivation, as employment in Head Start ensured African Americans could 
exercise their newly-acquired right to vote without fear of losing their jobs. It liberated the 
black community, getting the poor off welfare lists and providing them with a little dignity. 
The programs’ impact was not limited to the poor community. ACBC united the whole black 
community of Bolivar County. This unity engendered in support of the program enabled the 
election of Kermit Stanton, the first black official in the county.
39
 BCCAP Executive Director 
Earl Davis, having been unsuccessful in his attempts to ensure BCCAP was the sole recipient 
of Head Start funds in the county, turned to the press to air his grievances. Davis was the 
main source for a 1967 Wall Street Journal article, which characterised the War on Poverty 
as a goldmine and even contained reference to a Cadillac driving recipient of federal largesse. 
Davis gave several instances of alleged corruption in the delegate agency targeted to 
undermine ACBC, but his main complaint was OEO’s profligate spending as a result of the 
county’s parallel Head Start programs.40 The adverse publicity proved ineffectual; after the 
CDGM debacle it would take more than unsubstantiated accusations of corruption to provoke 
a response from OEO. Though it did not prevent BCCAP from their continued attempts to 
exercise control of the program and prevent ACBC’s efforts to promote meaningful 
engagement with the poor community. Head Start staff were prevented by OEO policy from 
engaging in voter registration activities only during working hours. BCCAP, in what an OEO 
Inspector euphemistically termed an ‘over-application’ of OEO policy, cynically prevented 
ACBC from engaging in any voter registration activities whatsoever. In frequent contact with 
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poor African Americans who were unlikely to have been reached during the earlier voter 
registration activities of either the middle-class oriented NAACP or the more radical SNCC, 
ACBC staff were perfectly placed to promote registration. BCCAP’s Board, exercising power 
beyond its remit, curtailed the potentially significant mobilising activities of over three 
hundred ACBC workers. 
Failing to undermine or gain control of ACBC, BCCAP’s Board turned to its 
powerful supporters for assistance. The attempts of successive Mississippi governors and 
politicians to undermine ACBC proved more successful. Both Governor Paul B. Johnson Jr. 
and his successor John Bell Williams vetoed ACBC’s funding, forcing staff to work 
voluntarily in order to keep a limited service running, until Shriver exercised his override of 
the governors’ vetoes. An early opponent of CDGM when he was a Congressman, Governor 
John Bell Williams in particular targeted his opposition at delegate agency Head Start 
Programs.
41
 In January 1970 his mass veto of four such programs based on his objection of 
their racial composition provoked angry demonstrations by the African American poor 
community who staged protests in front of the Governor’s Mansion.42 However, it was his 
demand for certain conditions to be attached to all Head Start programs that was most 
damaging. At his insistence, State Senator Arnie Watson sponsored a bill which required all 
Head Start teachers have at least two years of college education, and devolving power to the 
State Economic Opportunity Office.
43
 ACBC Director Billy McCain Sr. was committed to 
providing opportunity for the wider community. He made it his mission to employ and train 
Head Start parents; in 1969 three quarters of the staff were Head Start parents and less than 
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half of the staff had a High School Diploma.
44
 The bill drastically undermined the community 
involvement that ACBC had worked so hard to achieve as well as undercutting the main 
source of support for grassroots programs from OEO in Atlanta. Democratic politicians were 
not alone in their attacks on CDGM and its affiliated groups. The nascent Mississippi 
Republican Party took the opportunity to gain political capital by helping local whites 
eradicate CDGM remnants. The Mississippi GOP developed a relationship with the 
Republican OEO under Donald Rumsfeld and the Office of Child Development (OCD) at the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. OCD passed audit reports and other 
information onto Mississippi Republican Party officials, who used the information to 
discredit or undermine the delegate agencies. While their involvement was more significant 
in Sunflower County, Mississippi Republican Party Executive Director W. T. Wilkins also 
used his connections with DHEW Regional Director Cary Hall to obtain internal DHEW 
reports alleging corruption in ACBC.
45
 
In spite of the attacks of the wider white establishment and at least partially due to the 
attempts of BCCAP to subvert the program, the African American community united in 
support of ACBC. The program became a base around which black political activism was 
built, a source of unity and strength for the community which in turn strengthened and 
secured the funding of the Delegate Agency. ACBC still faced many of the difficulties of 
antipoverty programs; inadequate facilities, a hostile white community, governor’s vetoes, 
funding delays and insecurities and a local government adept at finding loopholes through 
which to deny public assistance to poor African Americans. Led by Billy McCain Sr., a 
motivated and tireless if overbearing Director, ACBC staff remained motivated, creative and 
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enthusiastic. Unusually for establishment CAPs at this time, BCCAP was also committed to 
providing a quality program, albeit on its own racial terms. So while race remained a potent 
source of tension, the two programs were partially united by this common goal. The existence 
of parallel Head Starts also served to ease tensions, BCCAP were less vicious in their 
attempts to undermine their delegate than many other establishment Community Action 
Agencies since it ran its own substantial Head Start. Competition between the two programs 
produced a ‘creative tension’ which benefitted both programs.46 The unity engendered by 
ACBC and the existence of the second Head Start program, ensured that absorption into 
BCCAP in 1973 did not mean destruction for ACBC.
47
 Combined, they survived funding cuts 
under Nixon, the demolition of OEO by Ford and Reagan’s war on welfare. Billy McCain 
Sr., who had been BCCAP’s Head Start Director since 1966 eventually served as Executive 
Director of the entire CAP for over thirty years. On his death in 2012, he was commended by 
the Mississippi State Senate as a Community Action pioneer dedicated to the War on 
Poverty, who enriched the lives of over 200,000 children and families in Bolivar County.
48
 
While the program developed strong links with the local community and over the course of 
the 1970s developed regular participation of the poor through the Policy Advisory 
Committees, few poor whites participated in the program. In 1979, 14 percent of the poor 
population of Bolivar County were white but only 6 percent of the white county population 
were involved in any of BCCAP’s programs. Despite its success, the program remained 
racially divided and service oriented. Over half of the county’s population remained in 
poverty by 1980 and BCCAP’s most successful programs were those providing nutrition; 
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Head Start and an Elderly Feeding program.
49
 Earlier white opposition was largely displaced 
by an evolving pragmatic response to the realities of the situation. The determination of the 
white community to control the entire Head Start program eventually paid off, but only after 
it had the effect of uniting the African American community in ACBC’s defence, unity which 
had significant consequences for black political progress in Bolivar County. When BCCAP 
had established their control, their racial pragmatism combined with a commitment to address 
the needs of the poor eventually enabled the successful operation of the biracial program. 
 
Sunflower County 
SNCC staff, arriving in Sunflower County in 1962 characterised it was the ‘worst 
county in the worst state’ in terms of racial discrimination.50 As the decade progressed, 
whites tightened their stranglehold on the county as they faced opposition from SNCC, 
NAACP and the MFDP. Though by no means the only planter to wield ruthless control over 
the lives of local African Americans, nor the only politician to exploit white opposition to 
Brown, Senator James O. Eastland and his home county became an emblem of planter 
domination and segregationist politics. While his correspondence reveals little of his direct 
involvement in his home county, Eastland’s commitment to white supremacy, his political 
power and his belief in the power of white terror against the majority black population 
permeated Sunflower County.
51
 Likewise, evidence of his opposition to antipoverty programs 
is easy to divine but rarely quantifiable. Characterised by his pragmatic approach to race 
relations in his county, Eastland made sure his opinion was understood and then let others 
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enforce it. His absolute opposition to CDGM was understood, though he did not make a 
crusade of it like fellow Senator John C. Stennis. Instead Eastland let it be known CDGM 
would be refunded in his county ‘over his dead body’ and set spies to report on the activities 
of CDGM and its successor MAP, while local whites created antipoverty programs in ‘his’ 
counties.
52
  
Such was the extent of white control and black fear of reprisals that when an African 
American grassroots Head Start program began operating in the county in 1965, they had to 
hold their classes in neighbouring Washington County. The group eventually opened centres 
in people’s homes in Indianola and extending to Ruleville in October 1965, for over five 
hundred children. They received support from CDGM, for example with staff training and 
some resources but, in accordance with Eastland’s dictate, were not refunded through CDGM 
in 1966. Organised by local women activists led by Cora Fleming, Alice Giles, Thelma May 
and Annie Mae King and including Fannie Lou Hamer, the group operated voluntarily for 
two years, facing ultimately insurmountable opposition from Sunflower County’s white 
establishment.
53
 The fame of Hamer, the presence of Eastland and the complexity of 
Movement struggles in Sunflower County have attracted many historians. The turbulent 
history of SNCC, NAACP and MFDP in the county, including the divisions in the local 
community caused by the grassroots Head Start program Associated Communities of 
Sunflower County (ACSC), have been detailed in biographies of Hamer and Eastland, in 
movement histories and studies of Sunflower County.
54
 However, the role of the 
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establishment CAP, Sunflower County Progress (SCP) has been largely overlooked. The 
group’s opposition to ACSC illustrates unexplored changes and continuities in Massive 
Resistance in Sunflower County, while SCP’s relationships with Democratic and Republican 
politicians further illuminates the national and local political significance of racial opposition 
to the War on Poverty. 
The white establishment in Sunflower County had a long history of exploiting federal 
funding intended to aid the poor population. Eastland helped create federal welfare policy 
that he and other powerful landowners benefitted from, providing them with federal subsidies 
and forcing their workers to accept near-starvation wages in order to survive.
55
 SCP was 
designed to serve as an extension of this control, to subvert federal funding away from 
grassroots African American groups so the 30 percent of the county population that was 
white could reassert control over the African American majority. Unlike the local 
establishments in Bolivar and the counties of Southwest Mississippi, Sunflower County’s 
local officials did not even attempt to adhere to OEO’s CAP Board racial requirements. Their 
application to OEO named an all white Board, only vehement opposition from local activists 
prevented the nomination of Police Chief Bryce Alexander, a man with a long history of 
perpetrating racial terror against African Americans, as Executive Director.
56
 Though OEO’s 
grant required SCP to include African Americans in their Board, SCP continued to exclude 
African Americans from the organisation.
57
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Having secured their control of the federal funds entering Sunflower County, the 
Board of SCP turned its efforts toward eradicating ACSC. Board members petitioned to OEO 
to defund ACSC, staff wrote to their local politicians and to OEO accusing ACSC of 
corruption. Raising the familiar spectre of Black Power, the white SCP staff alleged links 
between the Head Start program and militant activism.
58
 OEO’s attempts to encourage 
cooperation between the two groups failed. SCP’s Board refused to meet with ACSC staff; 
Cora Fleming recalled how ACSC staff members were turned away from meetings arranged 
for discussion of both programs futures. After weeks of refusals to meet with ACSC, the 
group received an invitation from SCP Board Chairman and Assistant Director to a public 
meeting at City Hall. When ACSC representatives, including Fleming arrived they were met 
with police in crash helmets carrying billies and blackjacks, who ordered them to leave.
59
 
When African Americans were included the powerful Board members such as Chancery 
Clerk Jack Harper dominated the meetings to the exclusion of outsiders, meaning those from 
outside of Indianola.
60
 Local white officials, experienced in uniting the minority white 
community against Sunflower County’s African American population focused their attacks 
on Fannie Lou Hamer. Hamer was by no means the driving force behind Head Start in 
Sunflower County; indeed, she had serious reservations about becoming involved in a 
federally funded program. However, her notoriety amongst whites after her appearance at the 
Democratic National Convention in 1964 made her an ideal target, serving to link the pre-
school program for poor children with militant activism in the minds of the local white 
community. When OEO forced SCP to hold elections to create a more representative Board 
of Directors Hamer, running against the white establishment’s candidate – an African 
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American man from Ruleville – lost. Hamer believed the election had been rigged, though 
federal investigators concluded the election had been fair. Rigged or not, local whites 
maliciously used Hamer’s defeat in the election in attempts to undermine with OEO for years 
to come. When Hamer appeared before a Senate Committee hearing into the War on Poverty 
in Jackson in April 1967, SCP Director Colbert Crowe and R. J. Allen President of SCP 
Board of Directors reacted angrily to public criticism of SCP, ironically claiming that their 
organisation, not Hamer was representative of Sunflower County’s poor.61 
Appealing to their powerful supports for help in putting their case to OEO, the SCP 
Board accused ACSC of harassing and intimidating SCP employees, teaching children Black 
Power philosophies and of staging protests in SCP Head Start centres. Lawyer Douglas Wynn 
again petitioned Harry McPherson to clamp down on ACSC, through OEO and any other 
federal agency. Wynn enclosed a ‘history’ of Head Start in Sunflower County, written by the 
SCP Board which claimed ACSC was a completely controlled subsidiary arm of the ‘Black 
Power MFDP’ designed to ‘manipulate the largely illiterate and ill-informed Negro citizens 
of Sunflower County to its own power politics ends’. Senator Stennis, who had been active in 
his support of establishment-controlled CAAs since the CDGM controversy, threw his 
support behind SCP. Stennis mediated with an unresponsive OEO and fought SCP’s corner, 
even when it was SCP errors that created the problems.
62
 OEO Director Sargent Shriver 
proved immune to appeals for support of SCP over ACSC. With the involvement of high 
profile Civil Rights Activists and the Senate Hearings having drawn national attention to 
Sunflower County’s Head Start program combined with continuing support for ACSC from 
the Regional OEO Office in Atlanta, Shriver was unwilling to be seen again undermining the 
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grassroots program in favour of the white establishment. OEO approved a $360,859 grant on 
July 1, 1967 forcing SCP to accept ACSC as its delegate agency.
63
 
However, the existence of delegate agencies was rapidly becoming a controversial 
issue. OEO under a Democratic Administration had provided support and protection for 
delegate agencies, providing protection (albeit of a limited nature) to grassroots African 
American groups against establishment attacks. In 1969, the administration of Head Start was 
moved from the Office of Economic Opportunity and into the Office of Child Development 
in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW). Planned in the final years of 
Johnson’s administration and finalised in the first year of Nixon’s Administration, the move 
was designed to protect the funding of the more popular Head Start while funding for 
controversial CAPs was allowed to dwindle. The move, combined with the change in 
administration had a significant impact on Head Start programs at the grassroots. The 
Republican DHEW showed little interest in fostering community participation and were 
unwilling to disrupt the control of powerful potential supporters. Cary Hall, Southeast 
Regional Director of DHEW provoked an angry response when he supported Governor John 
Bell Williams’ racially motivated vetoes against delegate Head Start agencies in 1970.64 
Former Mississippi Action for Progress Executive Director Dr Aaron Shirley accused Hall 
and DHEW of engaging in the racism characteristic of the Governor.
65
 Head Start staff and 
parents staged protests outside the Governors’ Mansion. ACSC Board Chairman Jimmy 
Herron accused Cary Hall of deliberately attempting to abolish delegate agencies in 
                                                     
63
 ACSC Audit Report July 1, 1967–February 29, 1968. John C. Stennis Papers Series 1 Box 5 Folder 1. 
Congressional and Political Research Center, MSU. This initial grant was followed later that year with a 
$30,000 supplement. 
64
 John Bell Williams to Cary Hall February 12, 1970. Mississippi Republican Party Records Series VII Box G-
3 Folder PATA/FA: HEW, Head Start Programs, 1969-1970. Special Collections Department, Mitchell 
Memorial Library, MSU. For example, Williams cites the 840 black and 35 white children in the Hinds County 
CAP.  
65
 ‘Two Groups Protest Head Start Veto’ Delta Democrat Times February 25, 1970 
Mississippi because they gave poor people and black people too much control.
66
 Head Start 
in Sunflower County was caught in the middle of this debate.
67
  
The growing Mississippi Republican Party latched onto white opposition to delegate 
agencies as a way to gain the support of prominent local officials and businessmen. Party 
Executive Director W.T. Wilkins established a rewarding relationship with Office of Child 
Development and DHEW officials in Washington and Atlanta.
68
 Cary Hall supplied him with 
inside information on Mississippi’s antipoverty programs, while the party in turn passed on to 
the OCD allegations and accusations of wrongdoing in delegate agencies. Their collaboration 
was particularly successful in Sunflower County. Bill Gresham, civic leader and powerful 
businessman from Indianola, member of the Citizens Council and active in the Republican 
Party, solicited the help of the Mississippi GOP to eliminate ACSC.
69
 Gathering 
unsubstantiated reports of ACSC wrongdoing, exerting their influence on OCD and dangling 
the prospect of the political advantage should they be the ones to defeat Hamer, Wilkins was 
central in securing ACSC’s demise. Some support remained in Washington for the grassroots 
group. Washington OCD employee Dick Orton’s attempts to convince Atlanta OCD staff to 
protect ACSC prompted a flurry of concerned correspondence between the Mississippi GOP 
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70
 Working together Cary Hall, Watson Munday, Barbara Whitaker and Bill 
Wilkins were able to overcome the remaining support for ACSC both in Washington and 
Sunflower County. Their hard work paid off. The decision on the future of the delegate 
relationship remained on the local level in the control of SCP, Wilkins and his contacts in 
DHEW ensured ACSC’s eradication at the hands of Sunflower County’s white 
establishment.
71
  
By January 1971, Wilkins, Reed and Gresham were celebrating their achievement of 
‘putting Hamer out of business’.72 However, Hamer had already come to accept that ACSC’s 
absorption into SCP was inevitable. Her acceptance of what amounted to the destruction 
ACSC created divisions in the group and provoked an angry response reaction from many in 
the poor African American community. Cora Fleming refused ever to talk to Hamer again. 
Hamer suspected that a firebomb, thrown into her home but failing to explode, was the work 
of angry ACSC supporters. Fleming continued to fight for ACSC’s survival, searching for 
other sources of funding for the group and refusing the position of Assistant Head Start 
Director created for her within SCP.
73
 While some ACSC employees realised that the only 
way Head Start would survive in Sunflower County was through SCP, Fleming refused to 
‘sign away the rights and toil of my people’ by leading them into the ‘devil’s arms’.74 The 
incorporation of ACSC (or as they termed it, ‘this boondoggle’) into SCP was undoubtedly a 
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victory for the Mississippi Republican Party. Mississippi’s Republican officials’ hoped their 
role would bring substantial credit to the Nixon administration, DHEW and the Mississippi 
GOP.
75
 While their role in support white supremacy was a factor in the slow but steady 
building of a base of support at the grassroots, it was perhaps the high point in their 
relationship with the Republican Administration. While their relationship with Rumsfeld was 
occasionally mutually beneficial – and with Cary Hall at DHEW and later Director of OEO 
Howard Phillips definitely so – Nixon’s support for Senator Eastland over Republican 
candidate Gil Carmichael in the 1972 election undermined the connection. While Mississippi 
Republicans remained opposed to grassroots African American run programs and supportive 
of white establishment CAPs, their contacts with DHEW and OEO never again aided with the 
destruction of a grassroots program. 
While SCP eventually absorbed ACSC, it was not the complete victory the white 
community could have commanded only a few years earlier. The volunteers of Freedom 
Summer had gone, leaving behind local activists to face the backlash from the white 
establishment. Racial murder, though less common in the 1970s still occurred; when a young 
black woman was murdered in 1971, the response of Sunflower County’s white 
establishment was silence and indifference.
76
 Freedom Summer received wide publicity, but 
the quieter local struggles of Head Start evinced small but significant changes in the nature of 
white opposition. ACSC’s incorporation into SCP served sustained white control, though 
some ACSC centres run by ACSC staff survived under SCP. It was another fifteen years, in 
the midst of a crisis over the appointment of the schools Superintendant before a biracial 
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Committee provided an arena for Sunflower County’s black and white residents to negotiate 
as equals and then with middle class, not poor African Americans.
77
 
 
In the two case studies this paper has explored, white opposition to African American 
Head Start was varied and often contradictory, reflecting Mississippi’s complex and slowly 
changing racial landscape. The commitment of local white establishments to maintain their 
control over local communities combined with sporadic and often less-than-strategic 
accommodations. Unlike the response to school desegregation, white resistance and 
accommodations to antipoverty programs did not follow an orderly, linear pattern that the 
epithet strategic implies. The measure and indeed existent of what Erle Johnston Jr. termed 
‘pragmatic segregation’ depended in large part on the widely varying local conditions; the 
impact of white opposition in creating unity or discord in the poor African American 
community, the strength of white supremacist influence on the white population and the level 
of national attention not just from OEO and DHEW, but from politicians and the media. 
Sunflower and Bolivar were by no means the only counties in which battles between CDGM-
remnants and establishment CAAs raged. In the east of the State, five former CDGM counties 
opposed involvement in state-wide CDGM replacement Mississippi Action for Progress, and 
instead formed the Friends of the Children of Mississippi. By March 1967, FCM were 
operating 130 centres for nearly 2000 children with 435 employees, on a voluntary basis.
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The group battled with MAP to retain control of its program and petitioned OEO for 
independent funding, eventually achieving an uneasy delegate relationship with MAP in May 
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1968.
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 The unwillingness of MAP to compromise on the level of control it wanted over the 
operation of FCM and the militant and often violent opposition of former CDGM staff to 
MAP created a volatile mix. Commission Director Erle Johnston Jr. exploited the situation to 
the full, seizing upon instances of violence against MAP employees in the FCM counties, 
eager to blame the violence on former CDGM employees.
80
 In Southwest Mississippi, the 
white population alternately bolstered and intimidated by the pervasive influence of the Klan 
ensured the former CDGM program met with violence, hostility and intimidation. The efforts 
of the Governor, State Sovereignty Commission and most significantly the establishment 
CAP Southwest Mississippi Opportunities combined with OEO’s incompetence and inaction 
in the face of the rampant racism crippled the former CDGM program.
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The legacy of CDGM is not limited to the positive impact on Mississippi’s pre-school 
education system or a tradition of grassroots activism.
82
 CDGM ignited another phase of 
Massive Resistance. Although white opposition to CDGM was not entirely successful it 
served as an important learning curve for Mississippi’s white establishment. The initial blast 
of opposition trickled down into local communities so that the mechanisms of white 
opposition could function where they did best, away from national attention and on the streets 
of poor Delta communities. Taking the lessons, though not always successfully, of what did 
and did not work in opposing CDGM, Mississippi white establishment forged a new 
opposition to African American advancement through antipoverty programs. Clothed in the 
rhetoric of earlier Massive Resistance, it opposed federal intervention and outside influence 
but drew on newer language incorporating Goldwater conservatism and post-race riots fears 
of Black Power, utilising the mechanisms of Massive Resistance such the Sovereignty 
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Commission and local white Citizens Councils in new ways. Councilmen now sat on CAA 
Boards and controlled federal funds. The Commission, instead of propagating threats of 
violent retribution or facilitating white terror, spied on Head Start programs, interviewing the 
staff and gathering audit reports to send to Stennis and to OEO. While the local Democratic 
Party had been the vehicle for earlier Massive Resistance, such efforts were frustrated by 
OEO in Atlanta and Washington. Though neither the White House nor Sargent Shriver had 
any wish to repeat the national humiliation of the CDGM debacle, this did not amount to 
capitulation to the demands of establishment CAPs, even when put forward by powerful 
Democratic politicians. The Mississippi Republican Party however, had greater success. 
Establishing themselves (albeit briefly) as white Mississippi’s key to gaining the support of 
Republican Washington officials in destroying the delegate agencies. 
  
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACBC  Associated Communities of Bolivar County 
ACSC  Associated Communities of Sunflower County 
BCCAP Bolivar County Community Action Agency 
CAP  Community Action Program 
CDGM  Child Development Group of Mississippi 
DHEW  Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
MFDP  Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party 
OCD  Office of Child Development 
OEO  Office of Economic Opportunity 
SCP  Sunflower County Progress 
 
 
